تويت
العراق: المُقامَرة الكبرى
ترجمها بتصرف: بدر العوفي
ترجمها بتصرف: بدر العوفي
وتستند الاستراتيجية الأساسية لوزارة الدفاع الأمريكية في حربها ضد العراق على الافتراض القائل بأن هجمة جوية عارمة ستطيح سريعا بالدفاعات العسكرية العراقية نتيجة لفرار الجنود من صفوف القوات المسلحة وانهيار القيادة المركزية، وسيتبع هذه الأحداث اجتياح بري تقوده الولايات المتحدة واستسلام سريع مشروط للحكومة واحتلال مخفف نسبيا على البلاد التي سيرحب مواطنوها بالإطاحة بالدكتاتور ومعاونيه في حزب البعث الحاكم.
وليس من المفاجئ إذا علمنا أن العديد من المحللين الإقليميين المطلعين على مجريات الأمور يحذرون من أن هذا السيناريو المتقن لا يرقى حتى إلى احتمالية اتخاذ صدام لقرار مفاجئ بعدم جدوى خوض حرب لا طائل منها قبل أن يجر أذياله إلى المنفى بشكل مخزٍ ويستبدل بشخص يوافق هوى الدول الغربية.
ويحذر المحللون من أن الحلقة المفقودة هي الافتراض القائل بأن معظم الشارع العراقي الذي ليس لديه أدنى سبب للهرولة للدفاع عن حزب البعث سيكون اليد الضاربة في الثورة على أي احتلال أجنبي يعتقد الكثيرون بأنه ليس إلا حملة صليبية تشن على العالم الإسلامي عامة والعراق على وجه الخصوص.
ويبدو الأمر كما يتصوره أحد المحللين الغربيين العائدين من العراق بأن صدام حسين يتسم بأنه طاغية مستبد إلا أنه يظل عراقيا وأي احتلال أجنبي لن يكون بمنأى عن الهجمات المستمرة ضده. وأفغانستان ليست ببعيدة عن ذلك، ولكن الأمر في المسألة العراقية أكثر سوءا.
وإذا ما كانت هناك مقاومة شاملة ضد الاجتياح البري الذي تقوده الولايات المتحدة فمن المحتمل أن يواجه جنود التحالف حرب شوارع تختلف تماما عن العمليات الحربية التي نفذت خلال حرب الخليج الثانية عام 1991م. وإذا تحقق ذلك الافتراض فمن المحتمل أن تتكبد هذه القوات أعدادا كبيرة من المصابين عند الاستيلاء على المدن الرئيسية كبغداد والبصرة حيث تتحصن فيها القوات الموالية لصدام بإحكام. ولا يجب أن نغفل خطر قيام صدام بالنزول إلى ساحة المعركة والقتال مستخدما سياسة الأرض المحروقة.
وحتى الآن تشير جميع المقترحات إلى أن وزرة الدفاع الأمريكية تأمل أن تنتهي الحملة العسكرية في غضون أسابيع بدلا من أشهر ، يليها عملية استقرار للقضاء على فلول القوات العراقية التي لا تزال موالية لنظام صدام. وهناك أيضا حديث يدور عن مهمة لحفظ السلام ترعاها إدارة الأمم المتحدة في كوسوفو قد تستمر إلى عدة سنين.
إلا أن ما ينطبق على كوسوفو لا يتناسب بالضرورة مع المسألة العراقية وذلك لعدة أسباب، وهنا لا بد أن نشير إلى أن أدق نموذج تاريخي يماثلها هو ما حدث من احتلال لألمانيا عام 1945م حيث لم يترك الحلفاء أي حكومة ألمانية فعالة بديلة لنظام هتلر وكل ما خلفوه هو بنيةً تحتيةً مدمرةً و جيشاً مهزوماً. وبذلك تطلبت إعادة الديمقراطية إلى ذلك البلد المدمر سنوات طويلة واستثمارات هائلة.
المصدر
Janes.com
Iraq: the great gamble
In the run-up to a seemingly inevitable second Gulf war, the stakes are frighteningly high. JID has asked its regional specialists to assess the possible consequences of conflict with Iraq and the even less predictable implications of a post-Saddam Hussein scenario.
The Pentagon's basic strategy for war with Iraq is predicted on the assumption that a massive air assault will result in the swift 'degrading' of Iraqi military defences; by widespread desertion from the armed forces and a collapse of centralised command. This would be followed by a US-led ground invasion, a swift capitulation by the government and a relatively easy occupation of the country whose citizens will be delighted at the ousting of the dictator and his Ba'ath Party cronies.
Unsurprisingly, many well-informed regional specialists are warning that this neat scenario is even less likely than Saddam suddenly deciding that discretion is the better part of valour before he heads off to a dishonourable exile and is replaced with someone more to the West's liking.
What is missing, they caution, is the prospect that ordinary Iraqis, many of whom have no reason to rally to the Ba'ath regime's defence, will take an active part in repelling any foreign invasion that is widely being seen as a 'crusade' against the Islamic world and Iraq in particular.
As one Western analyst who has recently returned from Iraq put it: "Saddam is a particularly ruthless dictator, but at least he is an Iraqi and any foreign occupation force is likely to be under constant attack. Think Afghanistan, but far, far worse."
If there is major resistance to a US-led ground invasion, then troops are likely to face the prospect of urban warfare - a very different proposition to the type of combat which was experienced during the 1991 Gulf war. If so, then there are likely to be significant casualty figures involved in the capture of major cities such as Baghdad and Basra, where pro-Saddam forces are expected to be well dug in.
Then there is the risk that Saddam will decide to go down fighting and institute a scorched-earth policy.
So far, all the indications suggest that the Pentagon is hoping for a military campaign lasting a matter of weeks, rather than months, followed by a stabilisation operation to eliminate remnants of the Iraqi forces still loyal to Saddam's regime. There is also talk of a peace-keeping mission, modelled on the UN administration in Kosovo, which might last for several years.
However, the example of Kosovo is inappropriate for a number of reasons. . . . In many respects, the most accurate historical parallel will be with occupied Germany in 1945, where there was no functioning national government, a shattered infrastructure and a defeated army. It took years and enormous investment to reconstruct the country as a democracy
The Pentagon's basic strategy for war with Iraq is predicted on the assumption that a massive air assault will result in the swift 'degrading' of Iraqi military defences; by widespread desertion from the armed forces and a collapse of centralised command. This would be followed by a US-led ground invasion, a swift capitulation by the government and a relatively easy occupation of the country whose citizens will be delighted at the ousting of the dictator and his Ba'ath Party cronies.
Unsurprisingly, many well-informed regional specialists are warning that this neat scenario is even less likely than Saddam suddenly deciding that discretion is the better part of valour before he heads off to a dishonourable exile and is replaced with someone more to the West's liking.
What is missing, they caution, is the prospect that ordinary Iraqis, many of whom have no reason to rally to the Ba'ath regime's defence, will take an active part in repelling any foreign invasion that is widely being seen as a 'crusade' against the Islamic world and Iraq in particular.
As one Western analyst who has recently returned from Iraq put it: "Saddam is a particularly ruthless dictator, but at least he is an Iraqi and any foreign occupation force is likely to be under constant attack. Think Afghanistan, but far, far worse."
If there is major resistance to a US-led ground invasion, then troops are likely to face the prospect of urban warfare - a very different proposition to the type of combat which was experienced during the 1991 Gulf war. If so, then there are likely to be significant casualty figures involved in the capture of major cities such as Baghdad and Basra, where pro-Saddam forces are expected to be well dug in.
Then there is the risk that Saddam will decide to go down fighting and institute a scorched-earth policy.
So far, all the indications suggest that the Pentagon is hoping for a military campaign lasting a matter of weeks, rather than months, followed by a stabilisation operation to eliminate remnants of the Iraqi forces still loyal to Saddam's regime. There is also talk of a peace-keeping mission, modelled on the UN administration in Kosovo, which might last for several years.
However, the example of Kosovo is inappropriate for a number of reasons. . . . In many respects, the most accurate historical parallel will be with occupied Germany in 1945, where there was no functioning national government, a shattered infrastructure and a defeated army. It took years and enormous investment to reconstruct the country as a democracy